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DEBT-FREE DELINQUENCY: CLEARING THE PATH FOR DEBTIMPRISONED JUVENILES
Eileen Funnell*
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern-day psychologists have long recognized that “parental
unemployment, low wages, and poverty” place immense stress on
family relationships.1 Child psychologists have gone a step further,
emphasizing that this type of stress can cause worsening conditions for
the children of the family, such as family separation, youth placement in
foster or group homes, and child homelessness.2 What has not yet been
universally recognized by these experts, however, is the government’s
role in exacerbating this family stress through the imposition of fines
and fees in the juvenile justice system. A lifelong debt sentence can be
just as hopeless as a prison sentence when your debt starts building
before the age of ten.
Research shows that in almost every state, system-involved youth
and their families are likely to pay multiple costs for varying levels of
juvenile system involvement.3 These costs can be imposed at various
points throughout a juvenile offender’s time in the system, and even
within one category of cost, an individual can be fined several times.4
The fees continue to mount despite a child being actually incarcerated,
as almost all states will still charge parents for a portion of that child’s
care and support.5 Criminal contempt, civil judgments, probation
violations, compounding fees, ineligibility for expungement, and
incarceration are just a few examples of consequences juveniles and
their families can face for failure to pay any of these fees.6 Most

* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Boston University.
1 Jordan Blair Woods, Unaccompanied Youth and Private-Public Order Failures, 103
IOWA L. REV. 1639, 1652 (2018).
2 Id. at 1652-53.
3 JESSICA FEIERMAN ET AL., JUV. L. CTR., DEBTORS’ PRISON FOR KIDS? THE HIGH COST OF FINES
AND FEES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2016) [hereinafter DEBTORS’ PRISON FOR KIDS],
http://debtorsprison.jlc.org/documents/jlc-debtors-prison.pdf.
4 Id. at 5.
5 Id. at 15.
6 Id. at 7.
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troubling of all, however, is that not all states impose these punitive
economic sanctions on juveniles constitutionally. In fact, many states do
so without any inquiry into the ability to pay, meaning that, in practice,
all families must pay regardless of their financial circumstances.7
On March 14, 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) circulated
a letter to state and local courts, reminding courts to take extra care
when imposing and enforcing fines and fees in all criminal justice
proceedings.8 The DOJ drafted this letter to remind courts of the factors
they must consider prior to imposing an economic sanction, citing a
fine’s economically-debilitating effects as a reason for more serious
deliberation.9 Over a year later, the DOJ recognized the heightened need
for cautionary recommendations in the juvenile system specifically,
where fees can be even more economically devastating and have an
enduring impact.10 This advisory was intended to achieve two main
goals: (1) to remind juvenile courts and probation departments that
some discretion must be exercised prior to imposing an economic
sanction on a juvenile offender, typically by investigating that juvenile’s
ability to pay; and (2) to ensure that other juvenile justice and state
agencies, primarily those involved in collection, were not imposing fines
and fees on juvenile offenders in a way that violated their constitutional
rights or prevented future development and rehabilitation.11
Unfortunately, despite the DOJ’s efforts, researchers estimate that
incarcerated juveniles and their families across the country are still
facing billions of dollars in outstanding fee assessments, with several
millions of dollars in additional fees being imposed annually.12 The
Juvenile Law Center’s research, which included a review of statutes and
surveys of citizens in all fifty states, shows at least forty-one states
reported that they impose costs, fines, and fees on juveniles.13 In doing
so, many of these states fail to acknowledge the serious harm the
juveniles and their families face as a result.14

Id. at 6.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ADVISORY FOR RECIPIENTS OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON LEVYING FINES AND FEES ON JUVENILES 1 (2017) [hereinafter
ADVISORY ON LEVYING FINES AND FEES ON JUVENILES], http://ojp.gov/about/ocr/pdfs/AdvisoryJuvFinesFees.pdf.
9 See id.
10 Id. at 2.
11 Id.
12 Jeffrey Selbin, Juvenile Fee Abolition in California: Early Lessons and Challenges for
the Debt-Free Justice Movement, 98 N.C. L. REV. 401, 411–12 (2020).
13 DEBTORS’ PRISON FOR KIDS, supra note 3, at 4.
14 Id. (discussing a national survey of lawyers, other professionals, adults with
previous juvenile justice involvement, and families, which revealed that costs, fines, fees,
7
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Children in the justice system are entitled to all of the constitutional
protections that adults receive. But when it comes to children, “courts
cannot stop at the protections afforded to adults.”15 When the first
separate juvenile court system was established in Illinois in 1899,
Illinois promised enhanced constitutional protection for children.16
Early advocates of a separate juvenile system envisioned one that
focused on rehabilitation, encouraged child development, and paid
special attention to the differences between juveniles and adults.17
Although the juvenile system has evolved over time, it still claims to
focus on “supporting youth, assisting rehabilitation, developing youth
competency, and improving outcomes.”18
In as early as the 1960s, however, critics began to grow skeptical of
the efficacy of a separate juvenile system, questioning whether juvenile
courts were more harmful than beneficial to young offenders.19 These
critics observed that juvenile courts were often arbitrary and punitive,
which was contrary to the therapeutic and non-adversarial system that
was initially promised.20 It is the punitive nature of the U.S. criminal
justice system that contributes to the unfair levying of fines and fees
against system-involved youth and their families.
When scholars have explored the issue of fines in the juvenile
system, they typically have analyzed the practice under the Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.21 Few
scholars, however, have addressed this issue under the Excessive Fines
Clause, which is the focus of this Comment. Analyzing juvenile economic
sanctions under the Excessive Fines Clause allows us to take a closer
look at the root of the problem—sentencing—thus cutting off the
problem at its source. While inquiries under the Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause are of great significance, they focus on the
and restitution in the juvenile justice system “posed significant problems for youth and
families[,]” but noting that states regularly impose these fines and fees nonetheless).
15 ADVISORY ON LEVYING FINES AND FEES ON JUVENILES, supra note 8, at 2.
16 See DEBTORS’ PRISON FOR KIDS, supra note 3, at 4.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Woods, supra note 1, at 1687–88.
20 Id.
21 While many arguments critiquing the constitutionality of economic sanctions
employ the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, there has been some argument
that the limited protection of the Fourteenth Amendment is not enough because an
equal protection analysis does not (1) address the question of whether pecuniary
sanctions are fines, or (2) contemplate ability to pay in the context of the constitutional
notion of ‘excess’ established in the Excessive Fines Clause. See Beth A. Colgan, Reviving
the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 290 (2014) [hereinafter Reviving the
Excessive Fines Clause] (arguing that relying on the Fourteenth Amendment does
nothing but “write the Excessive Fines Clause out of the Constitution”).
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“narrow window of . . . post-sentencing collections” and thus are outside
the scope of this Comment.22
The Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause limits the
government’s power to impose fines, whether in cash or in kind, “as
punishment for some offense,”23 and guarantees the right of adult and
juvenile offenders alike to not be subjected to excessive sanctions.24 An
economic sanction is considered a fine for the purposes of the Clause if
it is at least “partially punitive.” 25 A sanction is “partially punitive” if (1)
it is employed in response to some prohibited conduct, or (2) it is
treated like other common forms of punishment.26 This broad standard
reveals the Court’s interest in “capturing a broad array of economic
sanctions within the Clause’s scope.”27 A fine violates the Excessive
Fines Clause and is thus unconstitutional if it is “grossly
disproportional” to the gravity of the offense.28 The Supreme Court only
recently held that the Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, meaning the protection
against excessive fines is a Bill of Rights protection applicable to the
states.29
This Comment argues that all states should eliminate costs, fees,
and fines in the juvenile system, as they are always excessive as applied
to children who have no ability to pay, and thus are inherently
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.
To further explore this issue, Part II of this Comment discusses the
common types of economic sanctions imposed on juveniles and the
economic and legal consequences of each sanction. Part III argues that
imposing these costs, fees, and fines on juveniles is unconstitutional
under the Excessive Fines Clause based on all juveniles’ lessened
culpability and lack of ability to pay. Part IV explores current state
approaches to the issue of juvenile economic sanctions, while Part V
highlights proposed solutions to the problem, including universal
legislative reform, additional sentencing considerations, and fee-free
sentencing alternatives. Part VI concludes by suggesting ways to
implement the proposed solutions detailed in Part V.
22 Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison,
65 UCLA L. REV. 2, 9 (2018) [hereinafter The Modern Debtors’ Prison].
23 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998) (quoting Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602, 609–10 (1993)).
24 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
25 The Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 22, at 13.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Bajakaijan, 524 U.S. at 324.
29 Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019).
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II. CURRENT PRACTICES: PROBLEMATIC FINES, FEES, AND COSTS IN THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Across the country, juvenile courts may require youth, parents, or
both to pay a multitude of different costs, some of which may be
imposed before the court has even made a delinquency determination.30
While one might assume that judges treat all defendants who appear
before them fairly, many judges refuse to consider a defendant’s
financial circumstances even when required to do so and ignore a
defendant’s attempts to explain serious financial hardship such as
homelessness or the inability to support dependent children.31 But
judges are not always the actors to blame; in assessing many kinds of
economic sanctions, courts have limited (if not a complete lack of)
discretion.32 Many statutes mandate the imposition of certain economic
sanctions “without allowing the court any opportunity to assess
whether such sanctions are reasonable.”33 In fact, some statutes go as
far as to completely prohibit courts from considering a defendant’s
financial circumstances when assessing the amount of economic
sanctions.34
Even outside of the juvenile context, scholars have called monetary
sanctions “‘inherently inequitable,’” in that they are unfair to the many
offenders who are struggling financially but nonetheless have
judgments imposed against them or face court-related fee balances,
which they are unlikely to ever be able to pay.35 Critics of using
monetary sanctions as a frequent form of punishment have cited several
negative effects of unmanageable sanctions, including their tendency to
increase financial instability, thus undermining any deterrent and
rehabilitative goals of the punishment and potentially encouraging
future crime.36
Critics also note the unique frequency with which monetary
sanctions can create “derivative evils,” usually by increasing the
“financial and social instability of members of the debtor’s family” in
addition to the instability of the individual.37 Another derivative evil is
the disproportionate harm that economic sanctions impose on “low30 DEBTORS’ PRISON FOR KIDS, supra note 3, at 5 (describing these costs as including
court expenses, public defender fees, and costs for evaluations and testing).
31 The Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 22, at 59.
32 Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, supra note 21, at 289.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 R. Barry Ruback, The Benefits and Costs of Economic Sanctions: Considering the
Victim, the Offender, and Society, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1781 (2015) (citation omitted).
36 The Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 22, at 65–66.
37 Id. at 66.
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income families of color.”38 Although an extended discussion of the
racially disparate impact of juvenile economic sanctions is outside the
scope of this Comment, it is important to note that minority youth are
punished more frequently and harshly in the juvenile justice system
relative to white youth, leading to a gross overrepresentation of racial
and ethnic minorities.39 Economic sanctions are imposed on minority
youth with the same frequency and harshness, thus exacerbating
existing racial and economic disparities.40 It is fundamentally unfair for
the government to place juveniles in such dire circumstances only to
achieve a vague punitive purpose, especially when the economic
sanctions often include a host of charges related to the functioning of the
juvenile justice system, which has little relation to the crime itself.41
This inequity is only exacerbated in the juvenile context. Juvenile
economic sanctions can encompass costs related to (A) appointment of
counsel, (B) bail and detention, (C) probation supervision and
placement fees, (D) informal adjustment and diversion, (E) evaluation
and testing, (F) cost of care, (G) court proceedings or appearances, (H)
fines, and (I) expungement or sealing. Because all of these economic
sanctions meet the broad standard of being partially punitive,42 they fall
within the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause.43 Each type of sanction
is addressed in turn.
A. Appointment of Counsel
The imposition of fees interferes with a juvenile’s constitutional
right to counsel because children themselves do not have the resources
to pay for an attorney, family income is often considered before youth
are presumed eligible for a public defender, and administrative fees are
imposed beforehand, usually while offenders are applying for statefunded representation.44 By not automatically presuming juveniles

Selbin, supra note 12, at 407.
Id.
40 Id. For a deeper discussion of the overrepresentation of racial and ethnic
minorities in the juvenile justice system and its implications, see generally NAT’L COUNCIL
ON CRIME & DELINQ., AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF YOUTH OF COLOR IN THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM (2007), https://www.evidentchange.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/justice-for-some.pdf.
41 The Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 22, at 67.
42 See supra note 26 and accompanying text for a definition of “partially punitive.”
43 See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019) (citing Austin v. United States, 509
U.S. 602 (1993) for the proposition that even “forfeitures fall within the [Excessive Fine]
Clause’s protection when they are at least partially punitive”).
44 See NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, STATE JUST. INST. & NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR.,
ENSURING YOUNG PEOPLE ARE NOT CRIMINALIZED FOR POVERTY: BAIL, FEES, FINES, COSTS, AND
38
39
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eligible for an attorney “by virtue of their status as children,” and by
imposing application fees to determine eligibility for state aid in the first
place, the government “present[s] a barrier to children asserting their
right to counsel, as they must depend on their families to pay the fees.”45
Fees that are assessed as part of a juvenile’s case can result in (1)
extended probation and (2) financial obligations that “follow children
well into adulthood, impacting their ability to access education, housing,
and employment.”46 Conflicts can also arise even when families are able
to pay for the youth’s counsel, as the family may “feel entitled to direct
the representation of their child, rather than ensuring client-directed
representation.”47
B. Bail and Detention
According to the American Bar Association, “detaining children,
even for minimal periods, has an enduring traumatic impact, and also
increases recidivism.”48 This evidence is worrisome in the context of
economic sanctions because children can be detained for failure to pay
fines, and research has shown that “[c]onditioning a child’s liberty on
their ability to post cash bail” ignores the strong evidence of the negative
impact of detention on juveniles.49 Imposing bail that a juvenile or their
family is unable to pay “fosters ‘class-driven preventive detention’” and
fails to protect public safety, as the bail payment ends up penalizing
poverty more than it encourages appearance in court.50
C. Probation Supervision Fees and Placement Fees
Juvenile courts often require youth to pay a cost or fee for
probation or other supervision.51 These costs are often assessed
monthly, and a failure to pay the fees on time can be treated like any
other probation violation, constituting grounds for revocation of
probation and reinstitution of all or part of the original prison

RESTITUTION IN JUVENILE COURT (2018), https://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/
Bail-Fines-and-Fees-Bench-Card_Final.pdf.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
For a comprehensive understanding of the difficulty juveniles face in
attempting to get access to free counsel and the costs that go along with it, see generally
JESSICA FEIERMAN ET AL., JUV. L. CTR., THE PRICE OF JUSTICE: THE HIGH COST OF “FREE” COUNSEL FOR
YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2018).
48 NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, STATE JUST. INST. & NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra
note 44 (internal punctuation omitted).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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sentence.52 Twenty states have statutes requiring some payment for
probation or supervision.53 In many states, such as Florida, judges have
the discretion to waive costs for juveniles: judges can waive fees due to
an inability to pay, or replace fees with community service or the
“writing of book reports.”54 Despite this discretion, not all judges elect
to waive these fees, and accurately determining a juvenile’s ability to
pay requires detailed information, such as “tax records, links to the IRS
and state agencies, [and a] listing[] of all bank accounts . . . that judges in
the United States currently do not have available to them.”55 Even with
prosecutorial and judicial discretion, the practice of requiring juvenile
offenders to pay fees for probation supervision and other related
services “prolongs justice system involvement, puts youth at higher risk
for probation violations, and traps families in debt.”56
D. Fees for Informal Adjustment and Diversion
Diversion programs and informal adjustment programs are
programs that divert juveniles out of the justice system, which allow
young people to avoid its associated stigma, reduce costs to the state or
federal government, and improve access to mental health treatment.57
Unfortunately, these positive effects are offset by the fact that several
states charge diversion fees, which juvenile offenders must pay before
they can be diverted away from formal processing.58 These fees can be
recurring, with a monthly charge until “the informal adjustment or
diversion conditions have been completed.”59 Twenty-two states have
statutes requiring some sort of payment to receive an informal
adjustment or become a part of a diversion program, and many impose
serious consequences when an offender falls behind on payments.60 If a
juvenile-offender fails to pay his or her diversion fees, he or she will
likely be excluded from the program, forced into formal processing, and
the payment will turn into a civil judgment.61

DEBTORS’ PRISON FOR KIDS, supra note 3, at 10.
Id.
54 VANESSA PATINO LYDIA ET AL., DELORES BARR WEAVER POL’Y CTR., ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF
COURT COSTS AND FEES ON JUVENILES AND FAMILIES 10 (2017), https://www.seethegirl.org/
wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Assessing-Impact-Court-Costs.pdf.
55 Ruback, supra note 35, at 1807.
56 NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, STATE JUST. INST. & NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra
note 44.
57 DEBTORS’ PRISON FOR KIDS, supra note 3, at 12.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
52
53
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E. Evaluation and Testing
Juveniles may need various exams or assessments during their
participation in any juvenile justice system program, and fees often
come with each separate assessment. Such exams include mental health
evaluations, drug and alcohol assessments, tests for sexually
transmitted diseases, and DNA or blood tests.62 While the fees
associated with these tests are not intended to be punitive, they “place
youth who cannot pay at risk of juvenile justice placement, as well as
family strain and financial debt,” thus giving them the same punitive
effect as any other fee or fine.63 According to Juvenile Law Center
research, thirty-one states have statutes that impose costs of evaluation
or testing on the juvenile offender.64
F. Cost of Care
The fee cycle does not stop once the child is incarcerated or in the
state’s care. Nearly all states continue to charge parents for their child’s
care and support if they have a child involved in the juvenile justice
system, and a significant number of these states charge the juveniles
themselves for the cost of their care.65 These fees charge for what the
government identifies as “expense and maintenance” costs, which
include “food, clothing, shelter, [child supervision], child support
payments to the state,” and sometimes additional charges for “a child’s
custody, confinement, or placement in a residential facility.”66 Parents
also can be charged for other specific costs, including physical or mental
health treatment, case management, and education programs.67 When
parents are unable to afford the cost of care fees, juveniles may be
“deprived of treatment, held in violation of probation, or even fac[e]
extended periods of incarceration.”68
G. Court Costs
Court costs and fees are sometimes a specified dollar amount but
are more often a general obligation to cover any costs related to “service,
notice, deposition, travel expenses, prosecution costs, and other legal
expenses,” which cumulatively can result in thousands of dollars of

62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id. at 13.
DEBTORS’ PRISON FOR KIDS, supra note 3, at 13.
Id.
See id. at 15.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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debt.69 In addition to the debilitating debt imposed on juveniles as a
result of court costs, courts face severe reputational consequences when
the government imposes court costs on juveniles who are unable to
pay.70 Court costs and fees that are mainly “geared toward raising
revenue rather than addressing public safety” can create doubts about
the fairness and impartiality of the court imposing those fees,
encouraging distrust of the government-run justice system by its local
taxpayers.71
These court costs can undermine the court’s authority in the eye of
the juvenile offender specifically; a court that seems to be more focused
on raising revenue acts more like a “collection agency rather than a
neutral arbiter,” leaving offenders feeling as if they have not been given
a fair opportunity to try their case.72 Although the appearance of an
inequitable court system is damaging in all criminal justice systems, it is
particularly damaging in the juvenile system where “research
demonstrates that outcomes are improved when children and their
families feel they have been treated fairly.”73
H. Fines
A majority of states impose fines on youth and their parents.74
While some fines are imposed only for designated offenses as an
alternative to incarceration, others are “available as a general
dispositional option,” which means that the court has discretion to
impose these fines in cases they see fit.75 Unfortunately, regardless of
the type, fines have an “economically debilitating effect” on the lives of
juveniles and their families because they disrupt education and
employment opportunities, thus providing juvenile offenders with
fewer avenues to success.76 “Once a court orders juvenile [fines] to be
paid, the debt becomes a civil judgment enforceable against the parent
or guardian,” and—unlike some other civil judgments which can be
discharged in bankruptcy—debts owed to the juvenile justice system
never go away.77
DEBTORS’ PRISON FOR KIDS, supra note 3, at 17.
See NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, STATE JUST. INST. & NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR.,
supra note 44.
71 Id. at 3.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 DEBTORS’ PRISON FOR KIDS, supra note 3, at 18.
76 NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, STATE JUST. INST. & NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra
note 44.
77 Selbin, supra note 12, at 402–03.
69
70
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The story of Brenda Tindal is one of many stories of crippling
family debt as a result of juvenile fines. Tindal’s encounters with the
juvenile justice system began when her foster daughter was sentenced
to three months in a California juvenile detention center.78 As a
consequence, Tindal owed $16,000 in fines, which “resulted in the
[seizure] of Tindal’s income and tax returns” to satisfy the debts, and
eventually the loss of her home.79 Tindal’s story is not uncommon.
Because most of the youth and families in the juvenile system are lowincome, many families like Tindal’s are forced to choose between paying
their outstanding court debts or paying for necessities like food,
clothing, and housing.80 The reality is that families faced with paying
either their court debts or purchasing necessities do not have a choice:
families unable to pay these fines will only be forced deeper into debt
when their inability to pay “leads to [compounding] fees, late charges,
extended probation, civil liens, license forfeiture, and even
incarceration.”81
I. Expungement and Sealing
The imposition of fees does not end when juveniles attempt to exit
the juvenile justice system.82 While one of the purported benefits of the
juvenile justice system is a child’s ability to expunge or seal his or her
records, this is not done automatically in most states.83 On the contrary,
juveniles usually need to petition the court to seal or expunge their
records, and many offenders will need an attorney’s help to file such a
petition, thus resulting in additional attorney’s fees.84 Even if the
juvenile proceeds without counsel, there still can be fees “to file
petitions seeking sealing or expungement, to obtain criminal history
reports, and to effectuate sealing or expungement.”85 These fees can
dissuade many youths “from seeking sealing or expungement,” which

Erin B. Logan, Courts in Most States Charge Juveniles to Exist Inside the Justice
System. This Movement Wants to Change That, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/08/10/courts-in-moststates-charge-juveniles-to-exist-inside-the-justice-system-this-movement-wants-tochange-that.
79 Id.
80 NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, STATE JUST. INST. & NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra
note 44.
81 Id.
82 See DEBTORS’ PRISON FOR KIDS, supra note 3, at 20.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
78
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creates a barrier to future employment, impedes reintegration, and
ultimately impacts that juvenile’s future ability to pay.86
J. Restitution and Punitive Community Service
Although this Comment does not focus on the potential elimination
of restitution awards in the juvenile justice system, it is worth noting
that these restitution awards, which are “generally designed to provide
economic compensation for [a victim’s] losses,” can be damaging if
imposed without the appropriate supports.87 For example, research
shows that jurisdictions that integrate restitution with probation shift
the bulk of probation officers’ work “from counseling, social services, or
once-a-month visits to implementing and monitoring restitution
requirements,” making them the juvenile’s debt collector instead of
their counselor.88 Thus, although restitution may serve a clear
rehabilitative purpose, if imposed in the wrong way, these economic
sanctions can undermine the goals of the juvenile system and lessen a
juvenile’s chances of reintegration after finishing probation.
Like restitution, community service can be an appropriate sanction
on qualifying juveniles. On the other hand, community service that is
“merely punitive—including activities that impart punishment or
humiliation . . . does nothing to encourage reflection and community
engagement.”89 Any community service imposed on juveniles should be
focused on reparation and helping the juveniles “develop skills that will
provide for long-term success in the community and workforce.”90
Each type of economic sanction comes with its unique
consequences for juveniles, whether the fine serves as a barrier to
reintegration or as a compounding fee that pushes juvenile offenders
further into the system.91 Because the evidence shows that juveniles
almost always lack the ability to pay their own fines absent special
circumstances, Part III will explain why all fines are excessive as applied
to juveniles, thus making it unconstitutional to impose these fines under
the Eighth Amendment.92

Id.
NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, STATE JUST. INST. & NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra
note 44.
88 Id.
89 Id. For example, community service such as picking up trash on the highway in a
neon vest could be seen as merely punitive and humiliating.
90 Id.
91 See supra Part II.
92 See infra Part III.
86
87
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: WHY ANY FINE CAN BE EXCESSIVE IN THE
JUVENILE CONTEXT
The juvenile fee problem implicates several constitutional
questions: whether it is consistent with Due Process, Equal Protection,
and—as this Comment will explore—the Eighth Amendment’s
Excessive Fines Clause. Analyzing juvenile fines and fees under the
Excessive Fines Clause allows a closer look at the root of the problem,
and eliminating the practice of imposing fines and fees on juveniles at
the sentencing stage avoids the imposition of debt in the first place. As
mentioned, a fine violates the Excessive Fines Clause and is thus
unconstitutional if it is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of [the]
offense.”93 The crux “of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive
Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality,” meaning “[t]he amount
of the [fine] must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense
that it is designed to punish.”94
In the context of the Eighth Amendment, “excessive” means
“surpassing the usual, the proper, or a normal measure of proportion.”95
In United States v. Bajakajian, the Supreme Court established four
factors to consider when determining if a fine is excessive under the
Excessive Fines Clause: “(1) the defendant’s culpability; (2) the
relationship between the harm and the penalty; (3) the penalties
imposed in similar statutes; and (4) the defendant’s ability to pay.”96 A
look at the proportionality cases from which the excessiveness test is
derived reveals a few key principals that guide the Excessive Fines
Clause analysis: a “desire for equality in sentencing; the need for
comparative proportionality of sentencing based on offense
seriousness; . . . a concern for the potential criminogenic effect of . . .
punishment; and [a desire to not] unreasonably undermine . . . human
dignity.”97
It is worth noting, however, that federal circuit courts are divided
on whether wealth and income are relevant to the Bajakajian excessivefines analysis. Some courts have held that the ability to pay is relevant,
either as a proportionality inquiry or in addition to one, while others
have held that ability to pay should have no bearing on the Bajakajian
analysis whatsoever.98 What this circuit split underscores is that
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998).
Id. at 334.
95 Id. at 335.
96 Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 124 P.3d 408, 421 (Cal. 2005) (citing
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337–38).
97 The Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 22, at 47.
98 See id. at 55–57.
93
94
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determining ability to pay is not as straightforward as looking at a
defendant’s bank account or assets, and should not be treated as such a
simple inquiry.99
The following Sections address the Bajakaijan factors as applied to
juveniles, and ultimately conclude that juvenile economic sanctions are
unconstitutional and in violation of both the Excessive Fines Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.100
A. Juveniles and their Lessened Culpability
It is a fundamental principle of justice that “two people equally
culpable for the same offense deserve, and therefore should receive, the
same punishment.”101 An inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause thus
requires careful consideration of (1) the seriousness of the offense, and
(2) the defendant’s level of culpability.102 Subjectivist and objectivist
Eighth Amendment theorists agree that there is some validity to
“subjective consideration of offender sensitivity in cases in which the
use of a particular [form of punishment] may be cruel or excessive as a
result of age or serious medical condition.”103 The concept of equal
culpability and offender sensitivity is particularly relevant in the context
of juvenile proceedings; as explained below, the Supreme Court has
recognized that juveniles are inherently less culpable for their crimes as
a result of their age.104 Because of this, the Court has recognized that
only “the odd legal rule . . . does not have some form of exception for
children.”105 This means that judges should not levy the same fines
against juveniles and adults alike.
The Supreme Court solidified this principle in Roper v. Simmons,
holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death
penalty on offenders under the age of eighteen.106 The Court recognized
that children have lessened culpability when they offend, citing the fact
that children are not trusted with the same “privileges and
responsibilities” as adults to illustrate why their conduct is less morally

Ruback, supra note 35, at 1809.
Note that the Eighth Amendment is an incorporated protection, and thus the
restraints of the Eighth Amendment apply with equal force to the states and can be
analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
generally Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019).
101 The Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 22, at 48.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 51 n.273.
104 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005).
105 Miller v. Alabama, No. 10-9646, slip op. at 19 (U.S. June 25, 2012).
106 543 U.S. at 568.
99

100
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reprehensible.107 There are three notable differences bearing upon a
juvenile’s lessened culpability for the same crime: (1) a lack of maturity
and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility; (2) increased
vulnerability and susceptibility to negative influences and outside
pressures; and (3) the transitory nature of a juvenile’s character and
personality traits, making the juvenile more likely to rehabilitate.108 The
government already recognizes these differences by treating juveniles
differently, affording them less freedom by prohibiting them from
“voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent.”109 The
Court concluded that “[t]he susceptibility of juveniles to immature and
irresponsible behavior” was relevant to assessing a juvenile’s
culpability, and juveniles thus should be more easily “forgiven for failing
to escape negative influences in their whole environment.”110 For these
reasons, the Court extended the ruling of Thompson v. Oklahoma, which
prohibited the death penalty for juveniles under sixteen, to apply to all
juveniles under the age of eighteen, as eighteen is the “point where
society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and
adulthood.”111
Graham v. Florida further extended the holdings set forth in
Thompson and Roper, prohibiting life-without-parole sentences for
juvenile offenders “who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will
be taken . . . .”112 The Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids life
sentences without parole for non-homicide juvenile offenders because
of their limited culpability as compared to the severity of the
sentence.113 The Court reasoned that holding otherwise would be cruel,
as juvenile defendants deserve “some meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” once they
have reached adulthood and can fully appreciate the severity of their
crimes.114 According to the opinion, sentencing juveniles requires
greater leniency because juveniles are inherently at a “significant
disadvantage in criminal proceedings” since many juveniles “mistrust
adults and have limited understandings of the criminal justice
Id. at 561 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)).
Id. at 569.
109 Id. at 569.
110 Id. at 570.
111 Id. at 574.
112 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69, 74 (2010); see also Miller v. Alabama, No.
10-9646, slip op. at 17 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (agreeing with the holdings set forth in Roper
and Graham and emphasizing that making youth and all that accompanies it irrelevant
to imposition of prison sentences poses “too great a risk of disproportionate
punishment” under the Eighth Amendment).
113 Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.
114 Id.
107
108
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system.”115 These disadvantages in criminal proceedings can be
attributed to a juvenile’s “[d]ifficulty in weighing long-term
consequences . . . [and] a corresponding impulsiveness.”116 Finally, the
Court took issue with the fact that life-without-parole sentences deprive
juveniles of “the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and selfrecognition of human worth and potential.”117
Just as life-without-parole sentences give juveniles “no chance for
reconciliation with society [and] no hope,”118 imposing economic
sanctions on juveniles who lack the ability to pay deprives juveniles of
the same opportunities by sentencing them to a life of poverty with little
hope of rehabilitation. For this reason, Graham’s point that juveniles
should be treated differently than adults over eighteen for the purposes
of sentencing should apply with equal force to economic sanctions.119
Critics of the more lenient approach to sentencing for juveniles argue
that because the death penalty, which was the punishment at issue in
Roper and Thompson, is the most severe punishment, “the Eighth
Amendment applies to it with special force,” meaning that the reasoning
in Roper and Thompson cannot be extended to less severe punishments
such as economic sanctions.120 While it may be true that the Eighth
Amendment does not apply to economic sanctions with as much force
as it does capital punishment, this does not mean that economic
penalties are exempt from the purview of the Eighth Amendment. In
Harmelin v. Michigan, for example, the Court declined to extend the
sentencing requirements articulated in Roper and Graham to a drug
possession conviction because of “the qualitative difference between
death and all other penalties.”121 Harmelin did not deal with juvenile
offenders, but this qualitative difference in treatment between death
and economic sanctions is important to note, especially since it is clear
from Roper and Graham that juveniles have traditionally been treated
differently under the law.
B. Juveniles’ Inherent Inability to Pay
Courts should likewise examine juveniles’ ability to pay, both now
and in the future, before imposing a fine or punishment for nonpayment
because juveniles inherently lack the ability to pay almost any fine or

115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id. at 78.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id.
See Graham, 560 U.S. at 82.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991).
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fee, and this problem only compounds into their futures. For example,
children presumptively lack their own financial resources, and “[m]any
states restrict work for those under eighteen and limit their ability to
enter into contracts.”122 When considering a juvenile’s future ability to
pay, it is important to recognize that a juvenile offender facing probation
or participating in a diversion program will likely struggle to balance the
requirements of their probation or program, school, and a job.123 In
many states, juveniles can face extended probation or even jail time for
failure to pay juvenile fees that they were never equipped to pay in the
first place.124 The Constitution requires that, before punishing someone
for failing to pay a fee or fine, a court must inquire into that individual’s
ability to pay.125 Unfortunately, this almost never happens in juvenile
sentencing.
The Supreme Court established the requirement that judges are to
consider one’s ability to pay a fine or fee in Bearden v. Georgia.126 In
Bearden, the Court held that “a sentencing court cannot properly revoke
a defendant’s probation for failure to pay a fine and make restitution”
without evidence that: (1) he was responsible for the failure to pay, or
(2) other forms of punishment were inadequate to accomplish the goals
of punishment and deterrence.127 This holding was among the first to
establish that courts must inquire into the ability to pay a fine or fee
before imposing serious punishments. In Bearden, the petitioner was
indicted for the felonies of burglary and theft and was sentenced to
three years of probation.128 As a condition of his probation, the
petitioner had to pay $750 in fines and restitution.129 The trial court
never considered the petitioner’s ability to pay before imposing these
fines.130 In order to pay the first $200 of his fines and restitution, the
petitioner had to borrow money from his parents, and payment of the
remaining balance was made even more difficult when the petitioner
was subsequently laid off from his job.131 When the petitioner notified
the probation office that he was going to be late with payments, the state
immediately filed a petition to revoke the petitioner’s probation, based

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

ADVISORY ON LEVYING FINES AND FEES ON JUVENILES, supra note 8, at 8.
Id.
Selbin, supra note 12, at 412.
Id. at 406.
461 U.S. 660, 661–62 (1983).
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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on his inability to pay the relevant fines and fees.132 The Court, quoting
Justice Black, agreed that “[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind
of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”133 The
Court ultimately held that “in revocation proceedings for failure to pay
a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for
the failure to pay,” as it is fundamentally unfair to punish a person
further solely because they lacked the resources to pay their fines at no
fault of their own.134
The ability to pay should be considered in the initial sentencing to
ensure defendants are not forced into debt in the first place. In fact,
most sentencing guidelines “mandate that this factor be considered.” 135
In People v. Cowan, the First Appellate District of California held that,
based on previous Supreme Court precedent and because “ability to pay
is an element of the excessive fines calculus under both the federal and
state Constitutions,” a sentencing court may not impose certain fines
without giving the defendant some opportunity to present evidence as
to why an economic sanction exceeds his ability to pay.136 The court also
postulated that it is often “irrational to impose a funding burden on
litigants who are unable to pay, for collection from them, by definition,
is futile.”137 Further, in the context of the juvenile justice system, the
cost of collecting levied fees often outweighs any revenue that the fees
were supposed to provide in the first place.138
C. Balancing the Harm and the Penalty
Many fines and fees imposed in juvenile court are punishment for
a defendant’s inability to pay the initial sanction or the resulting
administrative fees. Juvenile courts purport to focus on rehabilitation,
but these fines and fees arguably do nothing to repair the harm caused

Bearden, 461 U.S. at 663.
Id. at 664 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion));
see also Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970) (holding that a State cannot subject
convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the maximum solely because
they are unable to pay their fines); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (holding that
a State cannot convert a fine-only sentence into a jail term solely because the defendant
is indigent and cannot pay a fine in full).
134 Id. at 672–73.
135 United States v. Hines, 88 F.3d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 1996).
136 People v. Cowan, 260 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 505, 521 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st App. District, Div. 4
2020).
137 Id. at 530.
138 See Selbin, supra note 12, at 408 (noting that most jurisdictions in California
collected fees at very low rates and did not generate significant net revenue. Research
also showed that counties spent, on average, more than seventy cents of every dollar of
fee revenues on the collection of them).
132
133
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or further that goal—instead, they drive juveniles further into
poverty.139
As the Supreme Court recognized in Harmelin, it is a legitimate
concern that monetary fines, unlike other forms of punishment, will be
imposed in a way that goes against the justice system’s goals of
rehabilitation and deterrence, since fines are a source of revenue that
the state stands to benefit from.140 Taking this concern further, it can be
argued that “the state will behave unfairly, and even nonsensically, in
the quest to obtain revenue.”141 The risk of unfair treatment by the
states is particularly harmful in the juvenile justice system where, for
the neediest defendants, excessive fines may result in the potential loss
of shelter, transportation, food and clothing, and can result in years of
lasting consequences.142 In fact, “court-imposed debt, even in small
amounts, may threaten an indigent person’s means of subsistence when
penalties, interest, and collections costs” flowing from the inability to
pay a sanction are considered.143 The “comparative disproportionality
of both immediate and post-sentencing poverty penalties is readily
apparent because they are triggered by a defendant’s inability to pay
rather than her culpability for the underlying offense.”144 Failing to pay
court-ordered debt may block access to early probation release and
hinder eligibility for expungement, both of which are essential to
rehabilitation after a juvenile is out of the system.145 Further,
delinquency on court-ordered debt may “diminish prospects for
employment and housing, disqualify the debtor from government
benefits[,] . . . put public housing out of reach, and create incentives to
obtain money by illegal means . . . .”146 This further works against the
rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system.
Moreover, the Eighth Amendment’s protection of human dignity
prohibits penalties that “degrade[] through the deprivation of basic
human needs such as food, shelter, health, and hygiene.”147 The
consequences of economic sanctions imposed on those juveniles unable
to pay are in clear violation of this dignity principle when families are
forced to pay juvenile court fees instead of buying their children food or
See ADVISORY ON LEVYING FINES AND FEES ON JUVENILES, supra note 8, at 10.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 978–79 n.9 (1991).
141 The Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 22, at 59.
142 Cowan, 260 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 530.
143 Id. at 533.
144 The Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 22, at 55.
145 People v. Cowan, 260 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 505, 533 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st App. District, Div. 4
2020).
146 Id.
147 The Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 22, at 69.
139
140
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paying for probation supervision instead of the utility bill.148 Juvenile
courts should consider whether imposing financial burdens on juveniles
serves a rehabilitative purpose at all—in many cases, “fines and fees will
be more punitive than rehabilitative, and they may, in fact, present an
impediment to other rehabilitative steps, such as employment and
education.”149
Proponents of juvenile economic sanctions as an alternative to
traditional probation and incarceration point out that economic
sanctions have four distinct advantages over traditional probation and
incarceration. Economics sanctions (1) use a metric that is universally
understood; (2) provide flexibility, in that they can be adjusted to suit
an offender’s specific circumstances; (3) can be used to help the victim,
restore justice, and punish the offender; and (4) can be used to provide
intermediate punishments, somewhere between probation and
incarceration.150 Unfortunately, these so-called advantages are idyllic.
Economic sanctions are typically not adjusted to suit the offender’s
circumstances, as courts oftentimes ignore the ability to pay and, as
argued here, do not consider potential mitigating circumstances such as
a defendant’s age and maturity.151 Economic sanctions also are unique
in that they “automatically invoke factors associated with wealth and
poverty, including race, class, education, job skills, and employment.”152
Further, only restitution and community service potentially serve the
purpose of restoring justice and helping the victim—the majority of
fines do nothing except benefit private corporations or go back into the
juvenile court system, causing a conflict of interest in courts and
agencies that impose, collect, and use the revenues collected.153 Finally,
economic sanctions imposed on juveniles are not the intermediate
alternative that scholars typically associate with monetary punishments
for adults.154 Unlike juvenile offenders, adult offenders typically have
some level of income and thus are more likely to have the ability to pay
fines and fees.155 This is not the case in the juvenile justice system,
where economic sanctions put juveniles in a “debtor’s prison” for life,
making the punishment far more serious than the initial fine.156
See supra Part II, Section H (outlining Brenda Tindal’s story).
ADVISORY ON LEVYING FINES AND FEES ON JUVENILES, supra note 8, at 10.
150 Ruback, supra note 35, at 1782–83.
151 See Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, supra note 16, at 328–29.
152 Ruback, supra note 35, at 1784.
153 Id. at 1814–15.
154 Id. at 1783.
155 See id.
156 See The Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 22, at 9; see generally DEBTORS’ PRISON
FOR KIDS, supra note 3.
148
149
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IV. CURRENT STATE REFORM: WHY IS IT WORKING?
Several states have already adopted legislation either eliminating
or aggressively limiting the use of economic sanctions in the juvenile
system. This includes, but is not limited to, the Washington State Youth
Equality and Reintegration Act (YEAR Act), California Senate Bill 190,
New Jersey Senate Bill Forty-Eight, and Maryland House Bill Thirty-Six.
All states should adopt provisions similar to the four discussed in this
Part. The experience of these states shows that eliminating fines and
fees is unlikely to significantly impact state and local finances,157 and in
fact can eliminate the risk that state fee practices will violate state law,
federal law, or constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection.158
Washington State Senate Bill 5564,159 more widely known as the
YEAR Act, eliminated several legal financial obligations for juveniles,
including general fines for felonies and misdemeanors; interest on
financial obligations; conviction fees; public defense costs; and over a
dozen more legal obligations.160 When imposing any legal financial
obligations that were not eliminated under the bill, the YEAR Act
requires courts to consider factors such as “incarceration and the
juvenile’s other debts, including restitution” when determining the
juvenile’s ability to pay.161 Similarly, New Jersey Senate Bill FortyEight,162 which became law on January 20, 2020, incorporated the
Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiative into the Code of Juvenile
Justice. Among other changes, this law eliminated “certain fines
imposed on juveniles.”163 New Jersey previously had some of the most
punitive fines in the country; however, the historic passage of Senate Bill
Forty-Eight not only eliminates fines as a penalty for youth but also
“allows for the termination of post-incarceration supervision even when
a youth has not made a full payment of all outstanding fines[,]” thus

See H.B. 36, 2020 Gen. Assemb., 2020 Sess. (Md. 2020); see also DEBTORS’ PRISON
KIDS, supra note 3, at 7 (noting the fact that juvenile incarceration itself is highly
expensive).
158 BERKLEY L. POL’Y ADVOC. CLINIC, FEE ABOLITION AND THE PROMISE OF DEBT-FREE JUSTICE
FOR YOUNG PEOPLE AND THEIR FAMILIES IN CALIFORNIA: A STATUS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF SENATE BILL 190 4 (2019) [hereinafter THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SENATE BILL 190].
159 S.B. 5564, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015).
160 WASH. S. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, ET AL., FINAL BILL REPORT, S. E2SSB 5564, 2015 Reg.
Sess., at 3–4 (2015).
161 Id. at 3.
162 N.J.S.B. 48, 218th Leg., Gen. Sess. (N.J. 2020).
163 Id.
157
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abolishing the requirement that offenders seeking discharge from
parole must provide proof that they have paid all fines and fees.164
Going even further, California passed Senate Bill 190165 in October
2017, making California the first state to abolish entire categories of
economic sanctions in the juvenile justice system and to eliminate a
subset of fees for young people who do not qualify as juveniles and are
in the adult criminal justice system.166 Prior to this bill becoming law,
almost every county in California was charging juveniles one or more
administrative fees during their involvement in the system.167 The
legislative record in California showed that “administrative fees
undermine[d] the rehabilitative and public safety goals of the juvenile
legal system, [fell] hardest on low-income families of color, and [yielded]
little net revenue.”168 Other findings showed that several California
county fee practices violated state law, federal law, and/or raised
serious questions about the constitutionality of fee practices under due
process and equal protection.169 Counties that imposed fees in violation
of state law often charged fees (1) not authorized by statute or (2) to
families of youth who were not found guilty.170 Counties that imposed
fees in violation of federal law, on the other hand, engaged in practices
such as charging families for “their children’s meals while seeking
reimbursement for those same costs from national school lunch and
breakfast programs.”171 In response to many of these findings, counties
across California began to voluntarily end all juvenile fee assessments
and collections, until Senate Bill 190 made the end of these assessments
mandatory statewide.172
Looking at the most recent legislation, Maryland House Bill ThirtySix,173 which was introduced in the 2020 session of the Maryland
General Assembly, proposed to repeal all statutory provisions that
“authorize the juvenile court to (1) impose civil fines or court costs; (2)
assess attorney’s fees; and (3) order a parent to pay a sum to support

164 Katrina L. Goodjoint, Opinion, New Jersey Just Eliminated Fines for Youth in the
Juvenile System. And That’s a Good Thing, STAR LEDGER / NJ.COM (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://www.nj.com/opinion/2020/01/new-jersey-just-eliminated-fines-for-youthin-the-juvenile-system-and-thats-a-good-thing-opinion.html.
165 S.B. 190, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
166 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SENATE BILL 190, supra note 158, at 1.
167 Id. at 3.
168 Id. at 4.
169 Id.
170 Selbin, supra note 12, at 405.
171 Id. at 405–06.
172 Id. at 409–10.
173 H.B. 36, 2020 Gen. Assemb., 2020 Sess. (Md. 2020).
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the child.”174 The bill became law on October 1, 2020, and renders
uncollectable any court-ordered fines, fees, or costs with an outstanding
balance.175 At the time this Comment was written, the Maryland General
Assembly anticipated that any potential loss of revenue as a result of the
bill’s prohibition against specified economic sanctions in juvenile
proceedings would not “materially affect State and local finances.”176 In
spite of this state reform, however, most states still impose fines and
fees on juveniles, so more systemic solutions are necessary. Based on
the success demonstrated by these states, it is clear that the systemwide reform and solutions recommended in this Comment can be
implemented with no negative impact on the overall efficacy of the
juvenile justice system.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: UNIVERSAL LEGISLATIVE REFORM, SENTENCING
CONSIDERATIONS, AND FEE-FREE ALTERNATIVES
All states should follow the lead of states, like California, that
eliminated juvenile costs, fines, and fees per the recommendations of
the DOJ and the National Juvenile Defender Center.177 As an interim
remedy before juvenile fees and fines can be wholly eliminated, juvenile
courts should be mandated to consider a juvenile defendant’s ability to
pay and his or her culpability based on age before imposing any
economic sanction. This would help to ensure that any fees or fines
imposed in the interim are not excessive or unreasonable under the
standard set forth in Bajakajian. Applying the same standard, courts
should likewise strike down any existing excessive fees under the Eighth
Amendment.
Congress and the states can also encourage change through
practices such as (1) using the Taxing and Spending Power to place
relevant conditions on state or federal prison funding; (2) encouraging
collaboration between high-profile leadership, bipartisanship, and
within the three branches; and/or (3) engaging with community service
providers and employers to create more alternatives to economic
penalties.178 In terms of economic sanctions that should be wholly
Id.
Id.
176 Id.
177 See NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, STATE JUST. INST. & NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR.,
supra note 44; see generally ADVISORY ON LEVYING FINES AND FEES ON JUVENILES, supra note 8.
178 For examples of current strategies and practices being used to encourage prison
reform in various states, see generally THE SENT’G PROJ., DECARCERATION STRATEGIES: HOW 5
STATES ACHIEVED SUBSTANTIAL PRISON POPULATION REDUCTIONS 4–8 (2018), https://
www.sentencingproject.org/publications/decarceration-strategies-5-states-achievedsubstantial-prison-population-reductions/.
174
175
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eliminated in the juvenile system, states should no longer impose
counsel fees; cash bail; probation supervision and placement fees; fees
for informal adjustment/diversion; evaluation and testing fees; cost of
care fees; court costs and fees; fines; and expungement/sealing fees.
Based on the inherent unreasonableness and particularly damaging
effects of fees for informal adjustment/diversion, cost of care, and
expungement/sealing, these fees should be eliminated first. Courts may
continue to impose (1) community service that promotes positive youth
development; (2) fee-free diversion programs; and (3) periodic
payment plans for existing fines and fees in the interim.179
A. Economic Sanctions to be Eliminated
In drafting and implementing a federal legislative solution,
Congress should eliminate the following economic sanctions in the
juvenile justice system. At the start of juvenile system involvement,
counsel for youth should be appointed without consideration of family
income, and children and their families should be exempt from the
imposition of any counsel fees. Shelby County, Tennessee, for example,
presumes that all children are indigent for the purposes of appointing
counsel and setting bond, while Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and North
Carolina all presume that all children are eligible for the appointment of
state-provided counsel.180 Both of these approaches are reasonable
solutions because each recognizes that juveniles inherently lack an
ability to pay. There should likewise be no general fines, evaluation and
testing fees, or court costs imposed on juveniles in the juvenile justice
system, especially when they are used as a source of revenue.
Similarly, Congress should prohibit the imposition of cash bail or
financial conditions on the release of juveniles. Juveniles should never
be detained for the inability to pay bail because, as this Comment argues,
this is unconstitutionally punishing poverty by ignoring the
requirement to assess the ability to pay under the Excessive Fines
Clause.181 Access to judicial hearings should not be conditioned on the
prepayment of fines, and no juveniles should be incarcerated or
detained for non-payment of financial obligations when the failure to
pay stems from poverty, lack of income, or an inability to pay. If these
fines and fees related to juvenile system involvement are no longer
imposed on juveniles, courts and other agencies will no longer be at risk

179 See NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, STATE JUST. INST. & NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR.,
supra note 44.
180 ADVISORY ON LEVYING FINES AND FEES ON JUVENILES, supra note 8, at 7.
181 See supra Part III.
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of enforcing fines and fees in a way that “punishes children for their
poverty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”182
Congress should excuse children and their families from paying
probation and post-release supervision fees. There should be no fees
imposed on juveniles for out-of-home placement. Even if Congress
elects to continue imposing supervision fees, inability to pay should not
be considered a probation violation, and failure to pay should never
result in incarceration.183 Additionally, no fees should be charged for
juveniles participating in diversion programs. If Congress still allows
courts to charge diversion fees, the ability to pay must be considered,
and access should never be denied or revoked for a failure to pay.
Congress should abolish the fees associated with juvenile expungement
or sealing, and this should be made clear to any juveniles seeking to
protect their records. Further, juveniles should be aware that their
outstanding fees and/or finances will not be considered in determining
eligibility for record sealing or expungement.
Finally, if a child remains stuck in the juvenile system, Congress
should adjust the current cost of care policies, and any failure to pay
these costs should not result in punitive action to the juvenile.
B. Appropriate Alternatives to Fines and Fees
While the majority of juvenile economic sanctions are
inappropriate and often illegal under the Eighth Amendment, there are
certain programs that may appropriately serve the rehabilitative goals
of the juvenile system. Courts can impose community service that
“promote[s] positive youth development and support[s] principles of
restorative justice, allowing the youth to repair the harm caused by their
actions.”184
For example, if a juvenile’s offense is theft, the
Constitutional Rights Foundation and the Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention suggested in a recent report that juveniles “talk
to owners or managers of local stores to find out about the impact of
shoplifting and write a letter to the editor of the school or local paper
about the subject.”185 In the case of vandalism, the same report
suggested that juvenile offenders “partner with school administrators,
local representatives, business owners, or park and recreation officials
to restore a public wall or playground that has been the target of

ADVISORY ON LEVYING FINES AND FEES ON JUVENILES, supra note 8, at 7.
DEBTORS’ PRISON FOR KIDS, supra note 3, at 10.
184 NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, STATE JUST. INST. & NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra
note 44.
185 CHARLES DEGELMAN ET AL., GIVING BACK: INTRODUCING COMMUNITY SERVICE LEARNING 29
(2006).
182
183

FUNNELL (DO NOT DELETE)

1208

4/7/22 4:22 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1183

vandalism.”186 Fee-free diversion programs and evidence-based
services to keep children in schools and out of court are similarly
appropriate.
For fines that continue to be imposed in the time before a universal
legislative solution is adopted, states should offer a periodic payment
plan for youth that does not charge onerous user fees or interest; allows
for electronic and web-based payments; and offers a mechanism for
youth to seek a reduction in their debt if financial circumstances
change.187 In New York State, for example, the Lewis County Transitions
to Independence Process (TIP) works with juveniles aged sixteen to
twenty-one “who have a serious mental illness and are
defendants/offenders
under
the
probation
department’s
jurisdiction.”188 TIP is an evidenced-based intervention program that
focuses on improving juveniles’ prospects for “employment, education,
housing and community life adjustment.”189 The program assists
participants in “obtaining and/or stabilizing resources related to these
categories, including linkage to services, case monitoring and providing
transportation as necessary.”190 Programs like TIP would not only
better serve the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system while we
await a legislative solution, but would also be more likely to improve
outcomes for juveniles involved in the system during this time.
VI. CONCLUSION
Consistent with Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and evidencebased research, economic sanctions, especially fines and fees, should
not be imposed in the juvenile justice system. Juveniles should be
presumed to lack the ability to pay from the beginning of their
sentencing, and any punishments should be appropriately adjusted to
match their lessened level of culpability. These changes would be best
achieved through universal legislation, following the example of states
like California and New Jersey, which have already expansively limited
or completely eliminated juvenile fees and fines.191
In order for the changes proposed in this Comment to be successful,
it is important to strike a balance between the uniformity and flexibility
Id. at 35.
NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, STATE JUST. INST. & NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra
note 44.
188 N.Y. Div. of Crim. Just. Serv.’s, Alternative to Incarceration (ATI) Programs, N.Y.
STATE, https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/opca/ati_description.htm (last visited Sept.
19, 2020).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 See supra Part IV.
186
187

FUNNELL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

4/7/22 4:22 PM

COMMENT

1209

of laws. Bright-line rules make decisions more “consistent and
predictable,” while discretion “promotes flexibility and efficiency,
allowing atypical case facts to be considered in order to do justice and
avoid unnecessary burdens and expense.”192 Any bright-line rules in the
juvenile system need to be created specifically for the juvenile offender
because any child in the juvenile justice system is an atypical case when
compared to the standard criminal offender. Economic sanctions can
destroy a juvenile offender’s future just as much as a prison sentence.
The rationale courts use to justify prohibiting juvenile life-withoutparole sentences should thus extend to fines and fees with equal force.

192 Richard S. Frase, Forty Years of American Sentencing Guidelines: What Have We
Learned?, 48 CRIME & JUST. 79, 115 (2019).

